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Abstract
In complex systems where humans and nature interact to produce joint outcomes, mitigation,
adaptation, and resilience require that humans perceive feedback—signals of health and
distress—from natural systems. In many instances, humans readily perceive feedback. In others,
feedback is more difficult to perceive, so humans rely on experts, heuristics, biases, and/or identify
confirming rationalities that may distort perceptions of feedback. This study explores human
perception of feedback from natural systems by testing alternate conceptions about how individuals
perceive climate anomalies, a form of feedback from the climate system. Results indicate that
individuals generally perceive climate anomalies, especially when the anomalies are relatively extreme
and persistent. Moreover, this finding is largely robust to political differences that generate
predictable but small biases in feedback perception at extreme ends of the partisan spectrum. The
subtlety of these biases bodes well for mitigation, adaptation, and resilience as human systems
continue to interact with a changing climate system.
1. Introduction
Although researchers debate whether Earth has tran-
sitioned from the Holocene to a new ‘Anthropocene’
geologic epoch, there is broad agreement that human
actions have wide-ranging effects on natural systems
that, in turn, have far-reaching effects on human sys-
tems [1–3]. In this context, mitigation, adaptation, and
achieving resilience require that humans accurately
perceive feedback—signals of health and distress—
from natural systems [4]. Climate change represents
a classic example of this complex coupling of human
and natural systems. Human activities contribute to
climate change, which alters ecosystems, and, conse-
quently, the ecosystem services that sustain human life
(e.g. food and water production) [5]. To preserve these
services or develop viable alternatives, humans must
recognize feedback—signals of climate change and
ecosystem decline—from natural systems.
In many instances, humans readily perceive feed-
back from natural systems. Farmers, for example,
recognize when irrigation and planting practices
increase production and residents of riverine commu-
nities notice changes in marine life that accompany
water pollution. In other instances, feedback is more
difficult to perceive; it is subtle, variable, and subject
to distortion. Again, climate change represents a classic
example. Signals of climate change, such as unusually
warm temperatures and/or less precipitation than aver-
age (drought), manifest over time and space, but are
nested in weather fluctuations that exhibit high vari-
ance in both time and space. This makes it difficult
for humans to perceive climate signals by way of direct
experience [6–10].
Figure 1(a) illustrates this process with a Bayesian
logic where individuals revise perceptions of natural
systems in accordance with feedback from those sys-
tems [11]. When signals are large and consistent, such
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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Figure 1. Modes of perception. Alternate conceptions about how individuals perceive feedback from natural systems.
as a string of hot summer days when temperatures are
routinely 5+ ◦F above average, individuals are more
likely to detect feedback and revise perceptions. When
signals are small and variable, such as a wet spring when
a few high precipitation days cause a modest depar-
ture from average, individuals are less likely to detect
feedback and revise perceptions. Instead, they may
rely on perceived experts (e.g. scientists, journalists,
or commentators), heuristics, biases, and/or identity
protective rationalities when assessing feedback.
In the climate domain, politically motivated rea-
soning [12, 13], illustrated in figure 1(b), represents
an alternative to Bayesian information processing
[14–16].Here, individualsfit perceptionsof feedback to
beliefs that cohere with their political predispositions.
In extreme cases, such predispositions overwhelm
feedback, causing individuals to ignore signals com-
pletely. In less extreme cases, predispositions distort
the feedback that individuals perceive, causing them
to accept signals that comport with predispositions
and reject signals that do not. On climate change,
for example, this propensity may cause strong par-
tisans to overlook feedback altogether or engage
in selective perception. Given the well-documented
relationship between political predispositions in the
United States and beliefs about climate change [16],
Liberal Democrats may not perceive unusually cold
seasons that are inconsistent with global warming,
whereas Conservative Republicans will. The oppo-
site may be true of dry seasons that are consistent
with warming—Liberal Democrats will notice them,
whereas Conservative Republicans will not6.
Do individuals engage in Bayesian information
processing, politically motivated reasoning, or some
combination of both when they encounter feedback
from natural systems? A key challenge to answering
this question is the lack of dynamic data. Both concep-
tions of human perception are dynamic: they posit that
individuals formulate and revise (or fail to revise) per-
ceptions as they encounter new information. To date,
6 Climate projections indicate that the impacts of climate change
will vary by region. Projections for Oklahoma and neighboring states
in the Southern Plains indicate that climate change will, on aver-
age, cause temperatures to increase, precipitation to decrease, and
drought to increase [17, 18].
most research on perceptions of feedback—including
on climate change—uses static data to make inferences
about these dynamics. For instance, numerous studies
compare perceptions with climatic conditions at a sin-
gle point in time across varying geographic areas (e.g.
counties, ZIP codes, and states) [6, 10, 19–31]. While
valuable, these efforts to identify relationships between
climate signals and perceptions assume rather than
demonstrate a dynamic process of perception change
in response to feedback, and they have yielded diver-
gent findings that complicate empirical generalizations
[14, 16].
2. Data and methods
In this study, we overcome this challenge with dynamic
data from the Meso-Scale Integrated Socio-geographic
Network (M-SISNet), a longitudinal (panel) survey
that continuously measures public perceptions of cli-
matic conditions in Oklahoma, a conservative state
where a large fraction of the population is skeptical
about human-caused climate change [32]7. M-SISNet
surveys are administered at the end of each season
(winter, spring, summer, fall) and begin with recurrent
questions about climate anomalies in the respective sea-
sons. Basic values, beliefs, and political predispositions
are measured once a year on the winter survey.
The M-SISNet employs an address-based sampling
frame that we geospatially and temporally integrate
with the Oklahoma Mesonet, a network of 120 stations
that continuously monitor environmental conditions
throughout the state [33, 34]. For example, each
Mesonet station measures air temperature and precip-
itation every 5 min. At the end of each day, Mesonet
7 The M-SISNet was created by a team of scientists in meteorol-
ogy, ecology, political science, sociology, economics, geography, and
anthropology at the University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State
University. Each quarterly survey begins with a set of questions that
measure perceptions of climate anomalies. These questions use the
exact same language (listed in table 1) and repeat every season.
Because of this, we believe that the measures are highly reliable—
they are consistent over time and across survey instruments. We
are also confident in the validity of the measures. In multiple inter-
views and pre-tests, subjects demonstrated a high understanding of
the questions and their relation to the concept that we are trying to
measure—perception of climate anomalies.
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Table 1. Measures and descriptive statistics.





M-SISNet Would you say that the amount of precipitation that
fell this [season] was more, less, or about the same
amount as in previous [seasons]?
More = 3 About







M-SISNet Would you say that this [season] has been warmer,
cooler, or about the same as previous [seasons]?
Warmer = 3 About






Mesonet Interpolated departure from 15 year average total





Mesonet Interpolated departure from 15 year average daily air







Mesonet Interpolated standard deviation of total daily rainfall







Mesonet Interpolated standard deviation of average daily air






M-SISNet [Combination of three questions] With which
political party do you most identify? As of today, do
you lean more to the Democratic Party or the
Republican Party? On a scale of political ideology,
individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal to
strongly conservative. Which of the following







a Centered at mean = 0 for the regression analysis.
operators aggregate these measures to provide daily
summaries that indicate the average air temperature
and total precipitation each day at each station.
Together, the geographic resolution and temporal
structure of these data streams allow for a dynamic
assessment of the relative roles of Bayesian informa-
tion processing and politically motivated reasoning in
human perception of climate anomalies. We conduct
this assessment by examining the extent to which 1760
M-SISNet panelists perceive departures from average
precipitation and temperature over the course of 11
consecutive seasons, summer 2014 to winter 2017.
Table 1 describes the measures we use for this analysis.
We capture perceptions and political predispo-
sitions with responses to M-SISNet questions. We
measure climate anomalies in two steps. First, we use
daily summaries from the Mesonet to calculate 15 year
(2002–2016) precipitation and temperature averages
and departures from average (anomaly) at each station
in each season. Then, we use ordinary kriging interpo-
lation to match these values to the geolocation of each
panelist in the M-SISNet sample. We measure variabil-
ity using a similar approach. We use Mesonet data to
calculate daily variability in precipitation and tempera-
ture at each station in each season and ordinary kriging
to interpolate these values to the address of each pan-
elist in the sample, providing a level of accuracy greatly
exceeding that employed in previous (static) studies
matching perceptions with climatic conditions at the
level of counties, ZIP codes and states.
In the analysis that follows, we use variation within
individuals across seasons to estimate the causal effect
of precipitation and temperature anomalies on per-
ception formulation and revision over time. We begin
by assessing the Bayesian conception of information
processing. Then, we look for evidence of politically
motivated reasoning.
3. Analysis and results
3.1. Bayesian information processing
Figure 2 provides a graphic indication of the dynamic
relationship between feedback and perceptions. The
grey lines indicate climate anomalies and perceptions
of those anomalies for each M-SISNet panelist in each
season; the black lines track sample means by season.
A comparison of the trends shows that individuals
generally perceive both forms of feedback, especially
when anomalies are sizable. It is notable, however,
that perceptions of temperature anomaly look to be
more responsive to feedback than do perceptions of
precipitation anomaly. This difference likely stems
from the relative magnitudes of the respective signals.
Apart from spring 2015, the temperature anomalies in
Oklahoma were more extreme than the precipitation
anomalies.
Statistically, we use ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression and a fixed effects estimator (the within
transformation) to test the Bayesian conception of
perception change within individuals over time. We
estimate separate models for precipitation and temper-
ature perceptions that take the following form:
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜌𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆(𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑉𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,
3
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Figure 2. Anomalies and perceptions by respondent and season. The horizontal axes represent seasons. The vertical axes in (a) and
(b) represent departures from average; the vertical axes in (c) and (d) represent survey responses (perceptions). The grey lines indicate
anomalies and perceptions for each respondent in each season; the black lines indicate sample means by season. We add random noise
to the grey lines in (c) and (d) to prevent overplotting.
where Y𝑖𝑡, the outcome variable, is a perception about
the climate for panelist i in season t, 𝛼𝑖 is an intercept
term (‘fixed effect’) for each panelist in the sample,
𝜌D𝑖𝑡 is the climate anomaly that each panelist experi-
enced in each season, 𝛿V𝑖𝑡 is the climate variability that
each panelist experienced in each season, 𝜆(D𝑖𝑡 ∗V𝑖𝑡)
is an interaction term that multiplies the anomaly by
the variability that each panelist experienced in each
season, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The coefficients for
the anomaly terms estimate the main effects of feed-
back on perceptions when variability is average (the
sample mean) and the coefficients for the interac-
tion terms show how this relationship changes when
variability increases (or decreases), relative to aver-
age. These estimates are shown in table S1 available
at stacks.iop.org/ERL/12/114004/mmedia.
Consistent with figure 2, the estimates show a
statistically significant relationship between anoma-
lies and perceptions (p< 0.001). At average levels of
daily variability (0.0), a 1 inch departure from aver-
age precipitation in a season increases (or decreases)
perceptions of precipitation in that season by approx-
imately 0.04 on the 1–3 scale. A more extreme, but
not uncommon 10 inch departure causes perceptions
to change by almost half a point. Perceptions of tem-
perature anomalies are more sensitive to feedback. At
average levels of daily variability (0.0), a 1 ◦F departure
from the average temperature in a season produces a
0.22 change on the scale of perceptions; a 5 ◦F depar-
ture causes individuals to revise perceptions by a full
point.
The estimates also show that daily variation signifi-
cantly moderates the relationship between anomalies
and perceptions (p< 0.001). A standard deviation
increase in daily precipitation variability reduces the
anomaly effect by 0.09. A standard deviation increase
in temperature variability reduces the effect of the
anomaly on perceptions by 0.01. Figure S1 shows this
moderation at different levels of variability. When daily
variation is low (−0.2), a 1 inch departure from aver-
age precipitation causes a 0.06 change in perceptions.
When daily variation is high (0.2), an equivalent depar-
ture from average precipitation produces a smaller
change in perceptions (0.02). The same is true for
temperatures. When daily temperatures in a season
are consistent (−4.0), temperature anomalies exert a
relatively large influence on perceptions (0.26); when
temperatures are more variable (4.0), the influence of
anomalies on perceptions declines (0.16).
These results are consistent with Bayesian infor-
mation processing. On average, individuals revise
perceptions about climate systems in accordance with
feedback from those systems. This is especially true
when the signals are large and consistent. Nevertheless,
the range of grey lines around the sample means in
figure 2 indicates that perceptions are heterogeneous.
When it was unusually wet, some respondents said it
wasdry;when itwasunseasonably cool, somesaid itwas
warm. Politically motivated reasoning may explain this
heterogeneity. In place of signals, partisans may rely
on political predispositions when processing climate
anomalies.
3.2. Politically motivated reasoning
We test for politically motivated reasoning both
descriptively and statistically. Figure 3 duplicates
figure 2, but adds two lines to each plot. The blue
lines track the sample mean for Liberal Democrats
4
Environ. Res. Lett. 12 (2017) 114004
Figure 3. Anomalies and perceptions by respondent, season, and partisan identification. The horizontal axes represent seasons. The
vertical axes in (a) and (b) represent departures from average; the vertical axes in (c) and (d) represent survey responses (perceptions).
The grey lines indicate anomalies and perceptions for each respondent in each season; the black lines indicate sample means by season;
the red and blue lines indicate sample means by season among Conservative Republicans (red) and Liberal Democrats (blue). We add
random noise to the grey lines in c and d to prevent overplotting.
in each season; the red lines do the same for Con-
servative Republicans8. A comparison of the trends
shows that theprecipitationand temperatureanomalies
experienced by Liberal Democrats and Conservative
Republics were nearly identical, but their respective
perceptions of these anomalies differed systematically.
Conservative Republicans exhibit a bias towards per-
ceiving greater precipitation and cooler temperatures.
Liberal Democrats exhibit an opposite bias, towards
perceiving less precipitation and warmer temperatures.
Though apparent, this politically motivated bias does
not overwhelm the Bayesian process; both groups
incorporate feedback when revising perceptions, espe-
cially when the signals are sizable.
Statistically, these findings imply that the differ-
ence between Conservative Republicans and Liberal
Democrats is in the intercepts rather than slopes that
define the relationship between feedback and per-
ceptions. We assess this prospect by examining the
distribution of intercept estimates (𝛼𝑖) for each respon-
dent in the models we describe above. These estimates
denote theaveragedistanceof eachrespondent fromthe
sample mean. As shown in figure S2, most respondents
were relatively close to the mean, especially in their
perception of temperature anomalies. Nevertheless, a
portion of respondents exhibit bias.
We examine this bias using OLS regression mod-
els with orthogonal polynomial terms to define the
relationship between individual intercept estimates (an
indication of bias) and political predispositions. Again,
8 The plot compares highly partisan groups, where Liberal Demo-
crat =−7 and Conservative Republican = 7. The difference between
the groups is even smaller when less partisan groups are included.
we estimate separate models for precipitation and tem-
perature perceptions that take the following form:
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽𝑃𝑖2 + 𝛽𝑃𝑖3 + 𝜀𝑖,
where Y𝑖, the outcome variable, is the intercept esti-
mate (‘fixed effect’) for each panelist in the sample,
𝛼 is an intercept term for the entire sample, and 𝛽P𝑖
is the political predisposition of each panelist in the
sample, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. We use a cubic form
of 𝛽P𝑖 because it allows for two inflection points in
the line that identifies the relationship between per-
ceptions and anomalies, one on the left and one on
the right side of the partisan scale. For these models, we
use the political predisposition that M-SISNet panelists
listed in winter 2017 (the most recent wave), but the
results are robust to measurement in other waves. The
estimates from these models are shown in table S2.
Consistent with figure 3, the estimates indicate
a statistically significant political bias in the inter-
cept estimates (p< 0.001). On average, Conservative
Republicans are more likely to perceive less pre-
cipitation and cooler temperatures than are Liberal
Democrats. Moreover, the second and third degree
polynomials are statically significant, indicating that
partisan bias manifests at increasing rates on opposing
ends of the political spectrum (p< 0.05; p< 0.001).
Figure 4 shows this tendency by plotting predic-
tions from the models as predispositions range from
Liberal Democrat to Conservative Republican. At the
extreme, perceptions of precipitation anomaly among
Liberal Democrats are approximately 0.1 points below
the sample mean; Conservative Republicans are 0.05
points above the sample mean. The opposite is true
5
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Figure 4. The relationship between political predispositions and individual intercept estimates. The vertical axes represent intercept
estimates and the horizontal axes represent political predispositions. The black lines represent predicted intercept estimates as political
predispositions go from Liberal Democrat to Conservative Republican. The grey regions represent 95% confidence intervals around
the predictions. The predictions come from the parameter estimates in table S2.
for perceptions of temperature anomaly; Liberal
Democrats are 0.1 points above the sample mean and
Conservative Republicans are 0.1 points below. These
patterns indicate a bias consistent with politically moti-
vated reasoning. Conservative Republicans perceive
signals that are inconsistent with global warming—
more precipitation than average and relatively cool
temperatures. Liberal Democrats perceive signals that
are generally consistent with global warming—less
precipitation (drought) and unseasonably warm tem-
peratures. Note, however, that these biases are relatively
small (less than 0.1 points on a 3 point scale) and tend
to be concentrated among individuals at the extreme
ends of the political spectrum (political predisposi-
tion =−7 and 7). In other words, politically motivated
reasoning does not overwhelm the Bayesian process
whereby both groups incorporate feedback when revis-
ing perceptions, especially when the signals are sizable.
This is true of even the strongest partisans.
4. Conclusion
Most conceptions of human perception imply a
dynamic process whereby perceptions change (or fail to
change) in response to feedback from natural systems.
While researchers often agree with these conceptions,
data limitations have made it difficult to evaluate
and compare them. For example, previous research
on human perception of climate anomalies gener-
ally uses static data to compare dynamic processes
like Bayesian information processing and politically
motivated reasoning. These studies have yielded diver-
gent findings that complicate our understanding of
how individuals perceive feedback from the climate
system.Wehaveaddressed this complicationbymatch-
ing high-resolution data on climate conditions to
dynamic (panel) data that track changes in percep-
tions over time. Our results show that residents of
Oklahoma, a US state where ‘global warming’ gets a
chilly reception, generally perceive climate anomalies,
especially when they are relatively extreme and persis-
tent. Moreover, our findings indicate that this pattern is
largely robust to political differences that generate pre-
dictable but small biases in perception at extreme ends
of the partisan spectrum. This finding adds important
nuance to our understanding of politically motivated
reasoning. Cognitive processes like biased assimilation
[35] and confirmation bias [36] influence perception,
but the influence is not so strong that it causes par-
tisans to completely miss or ignore feedback from
the climate system.
We take these results to be reasonably hearten-
ing, but more work is necessary on the values, beliefs,
and identities that may induce motivated reasoning.
Here, we focus on political predispositions, but it
is quite possible that geographic identities, cultural
worldviews, religious beliefs, economic interests and
a variety of other factors cause humans to perceive
and/or misperceive feedback from the climate sys-
tem. More work is also necessary to understand how
human perception of climate anomalies relates to
broader beliefs about climate change and public pol-
icy. Research in this direction will continue to advance
our understanding of complex systems, where efforts
to promote mitigation, adaptation, and resilience
require that humans perceive feedback from the
environment.
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